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Single Idea 9599
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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Full Idea
It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain.
Gist of Idea
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain
Source
Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2)
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' [Blackwell 2007], p.218
A Reaction
I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[treating some aspects of reality as inherently vague]:
13187
|
In actual things nothing is indefinite
[Leibniz]
|
21628
|
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible
[Dummett]
|
6978
|
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
[Jackson]
|
7987
|
Nothing is true, but everything is exact
[Baudrillard]
|
16129
|
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
|
16459
|
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
|
16460
|
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
|
16457
|
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
|
8983
|
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things
[Sainsbury]
|
9064
|
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9599
|
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain
[Williamson]
|
21629
|
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness
[Williamson]
|
16219
|
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
[Hawley]
|
16223
|
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
[Hawley]
|
6135
|
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
[Merricks]
|