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Single Idea 9599

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality ]

Full Idea

It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain.

Gist of Idea

There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain

Source

Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' [Blackwell 2007], p.218


A Reaction

I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'.


The 13 ideas from 'The Philosophy of Philosophy'

Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]