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Single Idea 9602

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects ]

Full Idea

The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness.

Gist of Idea

Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness

Source

Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' [Blackwell 2007], p.290


A Reaction

Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic.


The 29 ideas with the same theme [distinct objects with uncertain boundaries]:

A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus]
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]