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Single Idea 9602

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects ]

Full Idea

The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness.

Gist of Idea

Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness

Source

Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' [Blackwell 2007], p.290


A Reaction

Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic.


The 13 ideas from 'The Philosophy of Philosophy'

Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]