more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 9610

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism ]

Full Idea

Numbers are not 'abstract' (in the old sense, of universals abstracted from particulars), since each of the integers is a unique individual, a particular, not a universal.

Gist of Idea

Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular

Source

James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2)

Book Ref

Brown,James Robert: 'Philosophy of Mathematics' [Routledge 2002], p.12


A Reaction

An interesting observation which I have not seen directly stated before. Compare Idea 645. I suspect that numbers should be thought of as higher-order abstractions, which don't behave like normal universals (i.e. they're not distributed).

Related Ideas

Idea 645 If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]

Idea 8311 If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]


The 19 ideas with the same theme [denials that mathematics is rooted in experience]:

The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]