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Single Idea 9655
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
]
Full Idea
We can't take a property as sets of this-worldly instances, because two properties may be coextensive. Some say it is just as bad in all possible worlds, if the property is necessary, as when all triangles are trilateral, which seem different.
Gist of Idea
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.55
A Reaction
[compressed] Renate/cordate is the standard example of the first problem. Lewis seems to equivocate over exactly what is meant by a property. I take the example to be a powerful objection to treating properties as sets.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[properties are just classes of certain objects]:
21575
|
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group
[Russell]
|
9127
|
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property
[Russell, by Sorensen]
|
15478
|
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes
[Martin,CB]
|
12672
|
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
[Ellis]
|
19173
|
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
|
9783
|
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes
[Cartwright,R]
|
15399
|
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
15732
|
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
[Lewis]
|
15733
|
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
[Lewis]
|
15734
|
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
[Lewis]
|
9655
|
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
[Lewis]
|
10723
|
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
9653
|
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
[Lewis]
|
16290
|
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
[Lewis]
|
15516
|
A property is any class of possibilia
[Lewis]
|
4038
|
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate')
[Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
14499
|
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars
[Lewis, by Koslicki]
|
7703
|
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
[Jacquette]
|
18511
|
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
|
10591
|
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it
[Shapiro]
|
21729
|
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property
[Linsky,B]
|
10413
|
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
[Swoyer]
|