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Single Idea 9660

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible ]

Full Idea

Imaginability is a poor criterion of possibility. We can imagine the impossible provided we do not imagine it in perfect detail and all the time.

Gist of Idea

The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.8)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.90


A Reaction

In general I agree, but Williamson nicely opposes this view. The fact is that we derive most of our understanding of what is possible from imagination. We just have to realise that we can get it wrong, and so must attend to detail.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [seems conceivable when not actually possible]:

Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes]
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]