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Single Idea 9669
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
]
Full Idea
There are no free-floating possibilia. Every possibility is part of a world - exactly one world - and thus comes surrounded by worldmates, and fully equipped with extrinsic properties in virtue of its relations to them.
Gist of Idea
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 4.4)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.230
A Reaction
This is a key claim in the possible worlds understanding of modality, contrary to the more common sense and normal language claim that a possibility is an isolated thing.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[existence of non-actual possible worlds]:
19402
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The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible
[Leibniz]
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19434
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There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues
[Leibniz]
|
15883
|
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility
[Leibniz, by Harré]
|
18822
|
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class
[Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
|
7837
|
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things
[Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
|
14460
|
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary
[Russell]
|
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
|
23470
|
Each thing is in a space of possible facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
11183
|
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects)
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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16957
|
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility
[Dummett]
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc.
[Plantinga]
|
4943
|
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
[Kripke]
|
11984
|
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
[Plantinga]
|
4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
|
16429
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A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
[Stalnaker]
|
16397
|
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
[Stalnaker]
|
16399
|
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
[Stalnaker]
|
16398
|
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
[Stalnaker]
|
9669
|
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
7691
|
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
[Jacquette]
|
10266
|
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic?
[Shapiro]
|
4207
|
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds
[Lowe]
|
19279
|
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary?
[Hale]
|
10983
|
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics
[Read]
|
7792
|
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics
[Girle]
|
5734
|
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives
[Melia]
|
5742
|
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers
[Melia]
|
5743
|
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal
[Melia]
|
5749
|
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books
[Melia]
|
18745
|
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
18747
|
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
17956
|
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
[Vetter]
|