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Single Idea 9751

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self ]

Full Idea

To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena.

Clarification

'Noumena' are true realities, as opposed to 'phenomena'

Gist of Idea

To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena

Source

report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' xi

Book Ref

Korsgaard,Christine M.: 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [CUP 1996], p.-8


A Reaction

An illuminating idea. We are inclined to thing of reality as 'out there', and hence potentially unreachable, but we actually experience 'being reality' directly in ourselves. Is this the germ of the whole of continental philosophy?


The 20 ideas with the same theme [Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:

The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]