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Full Idea
It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves.
Gist of Idea
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves
Source
Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [1984], §116)
Book Ref
Parfit,Derek: 'Reasons and Persons' [OUP 1985], p.341
A Reaction
This pinpoints how Parfit moves from a view of persons in terms of continuity of consciousness to a utilitarian morality. It brings out nicely what is wrong with utilitarianism - the reductio of a great ball of nice experiences, with no one having them.
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |