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Single Idea 9921
[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
]
Full Idea
In the disquotational view of truth, what saves truth from being wholly redundant and so wholly useless, is mainly that it provides an ability to state generalisations like 'Everything Fermat believed was true'.
Gist of Idea
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
Source
JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.2.c)
Book Ref
Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.43
A Reaction
Sounds like the thin end of the wedge. Presumably we can infer that the first thing Fermat believed on his last Christmas Day was true.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[truth has no nature, and refers to nothing]:
1564
|
True and false statements can use exactly the same words
[Anon (Diss)]
|
19185
|
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems
[Tarski]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
12129
|
'Truth' may only apply within a theory
[Kuhn]
|
19170
|
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
|
23287
|
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
[Davidson]
|
8819
|
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning
[Pollock]
|
23299
|
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences
[Horwich, by Davidson]
|
6336
|
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
[Horwich]
|
6337
|
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
[Horwich]
|
6344
|
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
[Horwich]
|
9921
|
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
|
4753
|
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
[Engel]
|
4755
|
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
[Engel]
|
14419
|
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
[Merricks]
|
12437
|
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit
[Azzouni]
|
15325
|
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept
[Horsten]
|
15344
|
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth
[Horsten]
|
15356
|
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws
[Horsten]
|
15358
|
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true
[Horsten]
|
15359
|
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property
[Horsten]
|
15368
|
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference
[Horsten]
|
18347
|
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
|
19098
|
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories
[Misak]
|
19104
|
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language
[Misak]
|
16338
|
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge
[Halbach]
|
16317
|
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them
[Halbach]
|
16316
|
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations
[Halbach]
|
16320
|
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory
[Halbach]
|
16319
|
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism
[Halbach]
|
15656
|
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions
[Halbach]
|
19075
|
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions
[Young,JO]
|