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Single Idea 9921

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth ]

Full Idea

In the disquotational view of truth, what saves truth from being wholly redundant and so wholly useless, is mainly that it provides an ability to state generalisations like 'Everything Fermat believed was true'.

Gist of Idea

'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'

Source

JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.2.c)

Book Ref

Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.43


A Reaction

Sounds like the thin end of the wedge. Presumably we can infer that the first thing Fermat believed on his last Christmas Day was true.


The 15 ideas from JP Burgess / G Rosen

Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]