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Single Idea 9922
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
]
Full Idea
According to many philosophical commentators, a force-field must be considered to be a physical entity, and as the distinction between space and the force-field may be considered to be merely verbal, space itself may be considered to be a physical entity.
Gist of Idea
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
Source
JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.A.1)
Book Ref
Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.102
A Reaction
The ontology becomes a bit odd if we cheerfully accept that space is physical, but then we can't give the same account of time. I'm not sure how time could be physical. What's it made of?
The
15 ideas
from 'A Subject with No Object'
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9918
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Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9919
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The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9921
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'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9922
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If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9923
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We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9924
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Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9925
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Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9926
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A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9928
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Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9927
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Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9929
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Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9930
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Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9933
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The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9932
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The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9934
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Number words became nouns around the time of Plato
[Burgess/Rosen]
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