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Single Idea 9923

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers ]

Full Idea

The modal strategy for numbers is to replace assumptions about the actual existence of numbers by assumptions about the possible existence of numbers

Gist of Idea

We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers

Source

JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.B.3.a)

Book Ref

Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.137


A Reaction

This seems to be quite a good way of dealing with very large numbers and infinities. It is not clear whether 5 is so regularly actualised that we must consider it as permanent, or whether it is just a prominent permanent possibility.


The 15 ideas from 'A Subject with No Object'

Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]