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Single Idea 9926
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
]
Full Idea
While in general a relation is taken to be a set of ordered pairs <u, v> = {{u}, {u, v}}, and hence a set of sets of sets, in special cases a relation can be represented by a set of sets.
Gist of Idea
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
Source
JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.a)
Book Ref
Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.150
A Reaction
[See book for their examples, which are <, symmetric, and arbitrary] The fact that a relation (or anything else) can be represented in a certain way should never ever be taken to mean that you now know what the thing IS.
The
15 ideas
from JP Burgess / G Rosen
9918
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Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9919
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The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9921
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'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9922
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If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9923
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We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9924
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Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9925
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Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9926
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A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9928
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Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9927
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Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9929
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Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9930
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Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9933
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The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9932
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The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9934
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Number words became nouns around the time of Plato
[Burgess/Rosen]
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