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Single Idea 9928
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
]
Full Idea
Mereology has ontological implications. The acceptance of some initial entities involves the acceptance of many further entities, arbitrary wholes having the entities as parts. It must accept conglomerates. Geometric points imply geometric regions.
Gist of Idea
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
Source
JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.b)
Book Ref
Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.156
A Reaction
Presumably without the wholes being entailed by the parts, there is no subject called 'mereology'. But if the conglomeration is unrestricted, there is not much left to be said. 'Restricted' composition (by nature?) sounds a nice line.
The
15 ideas
from 'A Subject with No Object'
9918
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Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9919
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The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9921
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'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9922
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If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9923
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We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9924
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Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9925
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Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9926
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A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9928
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Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9927
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Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9929
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Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9930
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Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9933
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The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9932
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The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9934
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Number words became nouns around the time of Plato
[Burgess/Rosen]
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