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Full Idea
For Frege, the extension of the concept F is an object, as revealed by the fact that we use a name to refer to it. ..We must distinguish the concept, the object that falls under it, and the extension of the concept, which is the set containing the object.
Gist of Idea
There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object)
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2
Book Ref
George,A/Velleman D.J.: 'Philosophies of Mathematics' [Blackwell 2002], p.21
A Reaction
This I take to be the key distinction needed if one is to grasp Frege's account of what a number is. When we say that Frege is a platonist about numbers, it is because he is committed to the notion that the extension is an object.
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |