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Full Idea
Frege's position is that 'being the same F as' splits up into a general relation and an assertion about the referent ('being the same' and 'being an F'). This is what Geach denies, when he says there is no such thing as being 'just the same'.
Gist of Idea
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F
Source
comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by John Perry - The Same F I
Book Ref
'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.91
A Reaction
It looks as if you can take your pick - whether two things are perfectly identical, or whether they are identical in some respect. Get an unambiguous proposition before you begin the discussion. Identify referents, not kinds of identity, says Perry.