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Full Idea
Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x.
Gist of Idea
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
Source
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
Book Ref
'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism', ed/tr. French,Uehling,Wettstein [Minnesota 1986], p.4
A Reaction
This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence?