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Full Idea
In 1918 Russell insists that the world does contain nonlinguistic things that are akin to sentences and are asserted by them; he merely does not call them propositions. He calls them facts.
Gist of Idea
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.81
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.81
A Reaction
Clarification! I have always been bewildered by the early Russell view of propositions as actual ingredients of the world. If we say that sentences assert facts, that makes more sense. Russell never believed in the mental entities I call 'propositions'.