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Full Idea
Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks
Gist of Idea
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks
Source
comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.392
Related Ideas
Idea 13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
Idea 13769 Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]