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Full Idea
In the no-truth theory of conditionals they have justified assertion or acceptability conditions but not truth conditions. ...The motivation is that only assertions have truth values, and conditionals are arguments, not proper assertions.
Gist of Idea
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
Source
Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'No-truth')
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.219
A Reaction
Once I trim this idea down to its basics, it suddenly looks very persuasive. Except that I am inclined to think that conditional truths do state facts about the world - perhaps as facts about how more basic truths are related to each other.