more on this theme     |     more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 14277

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals ]

Full Idea

Grice drew attention to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless by an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. I think he is right about disjunction and negated conjunctions.

Gist of Idea

A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it

Source

report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 2.4

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.8


A Reaction

Edgington considers Grice's ideas of implicature as of permanent value, especially as a clarification of 1950s ordinary language philosophy.

Related Idea

Idea 14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]