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Full Idea
Semantic truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which 'snow is white' can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence '"snow is white" is true'.
Gist of Idea
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true
Source
Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 18)
Book Ref
'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.33
A Reaction
This appears to identify truth with assertibility, which is pretty much what modern pragmatists say. How do you distinguish 'genuine' assertion from rhetorical, teasing or lying assertions? Genuine assertion implies truth? Hm.
Related Idea
Idea 19182 Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]