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Full Idea
Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'.
Gist of Idea
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order)
Source
report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.37
A Reaction
Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it.
Related Idea
Idea 22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]