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Single Idea 17721

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths ]

Full Idea

Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity (truth purely in virtue of meaning, debunked by Quine, he says) from epistemic analyticity (knowability purely in virtue of understanding - a notion in good standing).

Gist of Idea

There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding

Source

report of Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.4

Book Ref

Jenkins,Carrie: 'Grounding Concepts' [OUP 2008], p.44


A Reaction

[compressed] This fits with Jenkins's claim that we have a priori knowledge just through understanding and relating our concepts. She, however, rejects that idea that a priori is analytic.