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Full Idea
If propositions are abstract entities, more like the objects of mathematics, it seems mysterious that states of mind should depend for their causal powers upon the propositions which allegedly constitute their 'contents'.
Gist of Idea
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], 70)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.70
A Reaction
Compare standard objections to Platonic Forms (e.g. Idea 3353). You can't believe in abstract propositions, but be a reductive physicalist about the mind. So propositions are dynamic brain structures. Easy.
Related Idea
Idea 3353 If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]