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Single Idea 21326

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

In Locke's doctrine not only is consciousness confounded with memory, but, which is still more strange, personal identity is confounded with the evidence which we have of our personal identity.

Gist of Idea

Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it

Source

comment on John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.14) by Thomas Reid - Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory III.Ch 6

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.115


A Reaction

The same type of criticism as Russell's view of the coherence theory of truth (Idea 5424). I'm inclined to think that Reid has precisely identified Locke's main error. Some confuse the existence of a chair with our tests for whether the chair is there!

Related Ideas

Idea 5424 Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]

Idea 21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]