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Single Idea 16538

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds ]

Full Idea

If we explicate the notion of metaphysical necessity in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa, this may enable us to dispense with the language of possible worlds as a means of explicating modal statements.

Gist of Idea

We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences

Source

E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.16

A Reaction

This is the approach I favour, though I am not convinced that the two approaches are in competition, since essentialism gives the driving force for necessity, whereas possible worlds map the logic and semantics of it.

The 19 ideas from 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]