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Single Idea 22638

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds ]

Full Idea

Even if possible worlds could differ in many different respects, there is no useful way to combine these different respects into one measure of overall comparative similarity.

Gist of Idea

Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied

Source

R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.7)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.168


A Reaction

[idea of Michael Moreau 2010] This is an objection to the use of 'close' possible worlds in causation theories. The idea is true in general of the concept of similarity. It makes sense of specific 'respects', but not really of two whole objects.


The 32 ideas from 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]