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Single Idea 8320

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds ]

Full Idea

Possible worlds, conceived of as abstracta, surely exist 'in every possible world'.

Gist of Idea

Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.248

A Reaction

A possible very infinite regress, if a particular possible world is distinguished from another only by being perceived from Actual Word 1 or Actual World 2.. How many possible worlds are there? The standard answer is 'lots', rather than infinity.

The 67 ideas from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'

16414 Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
8258 Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
9414 Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
8260 Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
8267 Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
8265 Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
8263 An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe]
8262 How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
8266 Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
8268 Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe]
8269 Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe]
8270 Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
8271 An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
8272 How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
8273 Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
8275 Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
8276 Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
8279 The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
8280 While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe]
8283 Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
8281 Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
8282 Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
8284 The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
8286 Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
8288 Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
8292 Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe]
8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
8290 One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
8289 The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
8293 Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
8294 How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
8295 Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
8296 Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
16127 Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
16128 A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
16131 The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
16130 To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
15079 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
8298 Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe]
8297 Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe]
8299 Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
8300 Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
8301 Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
8302 Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
8306 You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
8303 Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
8307 Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
8308 Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
8310 Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe]
8309 A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe]
8311 If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]
8312 It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]
8313 Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
8314 Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
8315 Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
8316 Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
8317 To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
8318 The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
8319 One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
8320 Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
8321 All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
8322 I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe]
8323 It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
13122 Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]