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Single Idea 13053

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations ]

Full Idea

To provide an adequate explanation of any given fact, we need to provide information that is relevant to the occurrence of that fact - information that makes a difference to its occurrence. It is not enough to subsume it under a general law.

Gist of Idea

A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference

Source

Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.2)

Book Ref

Salmon,Wesley C.: 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation', ed/tr. Humphreys,Paul [Pittsburgh 2006], p.45

A Reaction

[He cites Bromberger for this idea] Salmon is identifying this idea as the beginnings of trouble for the covering-law account of explanation, and it sounds exactly right.

The 29 ideas from Wesley Salmon

4784 Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
16557 Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8411 Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
8412 A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
8413 Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
13047 It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
13065 Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
8409 Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon]
17093 Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
17492 Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
14366 An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]