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Single Idea 16563

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations ]

Full Idea

It is not regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities.

Gist of Idea

The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it

Source

Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophy of Science' [-], p.22


A Reaction

Good, but we had better not characterise the 'activities' in terms of regularities.


The 35 ideas with the same theme [explain events by showing laws imply them]:

Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden]
Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte]
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg]
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N]
The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N]
Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N]
Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N]
I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N]
You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N]
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird]
Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird]
Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum]
Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]