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Single Idea 14790

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation ]

Full Idea

The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it …is an inferential step which I propose to call 'abduction'. This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts.

Gist of Idea

'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.151

A Reaction

I take there to be no more important function within human thought than the procedure by which we give preference to one particular explanation. It only makes sense, I think, if we take it as part of a coherence theory of justification.

Related Ideas

Idea 14791 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]

Idea 17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]

The 117 ideas from Charles Sanders Peirce

14790 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
14791 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
14303 Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
14799 Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
14800 The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
14801 Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
14802 Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
14765 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
14766 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
14803 The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]
14804 Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
14805 Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
14806 If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
14781 A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
7634 Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
19089 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
7660 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
7661 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
14784 Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
19231 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
19228 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
19227 Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
19223 We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
19226 We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
19224 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
19225 I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
19222 Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
19220 We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
19230 People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
19221 Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
19234 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
19235 How does induction get started? [Peirce]
19236 Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
19233 Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
19232 In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
19240 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
19239 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
19241 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
19238 The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
19237 Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
19242 Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
19245 We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
19244 Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
19243 If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
19246 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
19247 The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
19250 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
19251 The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
19249 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
19248 Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
19252 Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
19255 Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
19253 We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
19254 Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
19257 Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
19256 Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
14777 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
14779 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
14780 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]