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Single Idea 16820

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation ]

Full Idea

We should considere Inference to the Loveliest Potential Explanation, …which links the search for truth and the search for understanding in a fundamental way.

Gist of Idea

Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding

Source

Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')

Book Ref

Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.61

Related Idea

Idea 16818 The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]

The 56 ideas from Peter Lipton

16801 A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
16802 Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
16803 Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
16804 Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
16799 Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
16800 An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
16809 Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
16807 An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
16808 An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
16812 An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
16811 An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
16810 Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
16806 An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
16813 To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
16815 Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
16816 In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
16814 Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
16823 Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
16822 Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
16824 Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
16817 Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
16818 The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
16820 Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
16819 IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
16821 Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
16825 How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
16826 With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
16827 If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
16829 We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
16828 IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
16832 If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
16836 My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
16831 A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
16833 We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
16834 To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
16840 To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
16837 Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
16839 Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
16838 Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
16847 Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
16846 A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
16849 Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
16848 Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
16844 A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
16841 Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
16842 We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
16854 Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
16855 The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
16853 We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
16852 Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
16851 The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
16850 Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
16856 It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
16857 Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
16858 We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
16798 We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]