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Single Idea 11385

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

If the principles are universal, they will not be primary beings [ousiai], ...but if the principles are not universal but of the nature of particulars, they will not be scientifically knowable. For scientific knowledge of any thing is universal.

Gist of Idea

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a08)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.76


A Reaction

Part of the fifteenth aporia (puzzle) of this book. Plato goes for the universal (and hence knowable), but Aristotle makes the particular primary, and so is left with an epistemological problem, which the rest of 'Metaphysics' is meant to solve.


The 1145 ideas from Aristotle

Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle]
Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle]
Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle]
Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle]
An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle]
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle]
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle]
From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle]
If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle]
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle]
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle]
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle]
What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle]
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle]
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
There is a gradual proceeding from the inanimate to animals, with no clear borderlines [Aristotle]
Plants have far less life than animals, but more life than other corporeal entities [Aristotle]
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou]
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi]
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle]
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas]
Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle]
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle]
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle]
It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle]
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle]
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle]
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle]
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle]
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle]
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle]
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle]
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle]
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle]
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle]
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle]
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle]
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle]
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle]
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle]
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle]
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle]
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle]
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle]
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle]
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle]
Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle]
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle]
'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle]
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle]
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle]
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle]
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle]
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle]
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle]
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle]
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle]
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle]
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle]
Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle]
A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle]
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle]
The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle]
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle]
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle]
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle]
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle]
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle]
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle]
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle]
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle]
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle]
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle]
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle]
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle]
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle]
A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle]
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle]
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle]
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle]
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle]
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle]
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle]
None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle]
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle]
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle]
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle]
Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle]
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle]
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle]
Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle]
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle]
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle]
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle]
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle]
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle]
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle]
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle]
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle]
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle]
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle]
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle]
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle]
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle]
Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle]
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle]
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle]
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle]
Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle]
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle]
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle]
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle]
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle]
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle]
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle]
Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle]
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle]
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle]
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle]
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis]
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle]
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt]
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt]
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung]
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart [Aristotle]
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle]
The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle]
It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle]
All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle]
Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle]
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle]
The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle]
The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle]
It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle]
Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle]
Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle]
People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle]
A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle]
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]