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Single Idea 11385

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

If the principles are universal, they will not be primary beings [ousiai], ...but if the principles are not universal but of the nature of particulars, they will not be scientifically knowable. For scientific knowledge of any thing is universal.

Gist of Idea

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a08)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.76

A Reaction

Part of the fifteenth aporia (puzzle) of this book. Plato goes for the universal (and hence knowable), but Aristotle makes the particular primary, and so is left with an epistemological problem, which the rest of 'Metaphysics' is meant to solve.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

11385 Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
12367 What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
12380 Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
12385 Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
11243 Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
21473 All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
17086 Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
14470 Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
11951 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
16850 Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
15005 Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
15692 People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]