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Single Idea 15831

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

I suggest that states of affairs constitute the objects of the theory of explanation.

Gist of Idea

Explanations have states of affairs as their objects

Source

Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.4)

Book Ref

Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.124

A Reaction

It is good to ask what the constituents of a theory of explanation might be. He has an all-embracing notion of state of affairs, whereas I would say that events and processes are separate. See Idea 15828.

Related Idea

Idea 15828 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

11385 Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
12367 What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
12380 Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
12385 Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
11243 Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
21473 All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
17086 Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
14470 Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
11951 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
16850 Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
15005 Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
15692 People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]