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Single Idea 19737

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

If we can train a system for prediction, it can essentially infer the structure of the world it's looking at by doing this prediction.

Gist of Idea

A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it

Source

New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12)

Book Ref

-: 'New Scientist magazine' [ 2013], p.29


A Reaction

[AI expert] This seems to be powerful support for the centrality of mathematical laws of nature in achieving understanding of the world. We may downplay the 'mere' ability to predict, but this idea says that the rewards of prediction are very great.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [predicting events as support for a theory]:

Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]