more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4807

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them.

Gist of Idea

A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it

Source

Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8)

Book Ref

Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.236


A Reaction

Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [predicting events as support for a theory]:

Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]