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Single Idea 5338
[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
]
Full Idea
The standard view of free will is that I have something like complete control over what I do. A stronger view (not widely held) is that I also have complete control over what I think and what I feel.
Gist of Idea
Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling
Source
Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 60n)
Book Ref
Flanagan,Owen: 'The Problem of the Soul' [Basic Books 2003], p.60
A Reaction
To claim free control of feelings looks optimistic, but it does look as if we can decide to think about something, such as a philosophical problem. Deciding what to say comes somewhere between thought and action.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[what exactly a free will is understood to be]:
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5118
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Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes
[Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
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8007
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Aristotle never discusses free will
[Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
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12961
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For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained
[Aristotle, by Leibniz]
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4118
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A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children
[Aristotle]
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6018
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Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian
[Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
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23329
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We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom
[Epictetus]
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23342
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Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible
[Epictetus]
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23330
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Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint
[Epictetus]
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5771
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Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different
[Boethius]
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22111
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Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone
[Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
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2283
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Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures
[Descartes]
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5010
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Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea
[Descartes]
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4814
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A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone
[Spinoza]
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3792
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We are free to decide not to follow our desires
[Locke]
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5023
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Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary
[Leibniz]
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3447
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All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it
[Johnson,S]
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5596
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We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
[Kant]
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3739
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Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
[Kant]
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23237
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The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will
[Fichte]
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23244
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Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing
[Fichte]
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21780
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A free will primarily wills its own freedoom
[Hegel, by Houlgate]
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3846
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Man IS freedom
[Sartre]
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9249
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Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom
[Camus]
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9267
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Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have
[Frankfurt]
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3292
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The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is
[Nagel]
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3800
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You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise
[Dennett, by PG]
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3803
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Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own?
[Dennett]
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2545
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Free will is mental causation in action
[McGinn]
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5338
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Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling
[Flanagan]
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5344
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Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living
[Flanagan]
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