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Single Idea 15811

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical ]

Full Idea

What picks me out uniquely, without relating me to some other being? It can only be the property of 'being me' or 'being identical with myself', which can only be an individual essence or haecceity, a property I cannot fail to have.

Gist of Idea

I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'

Source

Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5)

Book Ref

Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.33

A Reaction

Only a philosopher (and a modern analytic one at that) would imagine that this was some crucial insight into how we know our own identities.

Related Idea

Idea 15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]

The 32 ideas from 'Person and Object'

15801 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
15802 I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
15803 Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
15809 A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
15804 If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
15805 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
15806 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
15810 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
15811 I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
15813 People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
15814 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
15815 Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
15819 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
15816 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
15817 If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
15818 So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
15821 Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
15820 A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
15822 The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
15823 Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
15824 There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
15826 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
15827 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
15828 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
15829 The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
15830 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
15832 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
12852 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
12851 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]