more on this theme | more from this text
Full Idea
If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists.
Gist of Idea
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem
Source
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.310
A Reaction
It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so.
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |