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Single Idea 7110

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness ]

Full Idea

The superfluous transcendental 'I' is actually a hindrance. If it existed, it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through consciousness like an opaque blade.

Gist of Idea

If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two

Source

Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))

Book Ref

Sartre,Jean-Paul: 'The Transcendence of the Ego' [Routledge 2004], p.7

A Reaction

I see no a priori reason why consciousness should not be split in two, if that's how it is. Personally I am happy with a fairly traditional Cartesian view, that the self is the will and understanding, and the rest of consciousness is its working material.

The 21 ideas from 'Transcendence of the Ego'

22226 Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
7106 The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
7125 A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
7108 The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
7111 Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
7107 Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
7110 If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
7115 Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
7116 When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
7117 How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
7113 Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
7114 The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
7112 The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
7119 Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
7122 We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
7123 Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
7124 The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
7121 The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
7120 It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
22225 My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]