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Single Idea 7109

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self ]

Full Idea

It is possible that those who think that '2 and 2 make 4' is the content of my representations may be forced to resort to a transcendental and subjective principle of unification - in other words, the I.

Gist of Idea

If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally

Source

Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))

Book Ref

Sartre,Jean-Paul: 'The Transcendence of the Ego' [Routledge 2004], p.6

A Reaction

He suggests that thoughts themselves unite the mind, externally. If you think of thoughts as internal, you must resort to a transcendental fiction to unify the mind. Personally I think the mind is inherently unified by brain structures.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:

22528 The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
21317 Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
9751 To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
21450 Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
22060 The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
22066 Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
22016 The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
23243 Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
22073 The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
21225 The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
2940 The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3285 We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
3244 Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
3245 The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
7385 People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]