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Single Idea 8434

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals ]

Full Idea

According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true.

Gist of Idea

In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true

Source

report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.213

A Reaction

Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [facts in worlds different from the actual world]:

22303 It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
15260 Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
6884 Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
6882 Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
6886 Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
6885 Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
6883 Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
16249 A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
21663 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]