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Single Idea 17685

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction ]

Full Idea

Many philosophers of science have distinguished between 'simple induction' - the argument from observed Fs to all Fs - and the argument to hidden or theoretical entities (Peirce's 'abduction').

Gist of Idea

Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities

Source

David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.104


A Reaction

'Abduction' is (roughly) the same is inference to the best explanation, of which I am a great fan.

Related Ideas

Idea 14791 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]

Idea 14790 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]


The 32 ideas with the same theme [why induction cannot justify generalised truths]:

We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A]
Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum]