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Single Idea 9078

[filed under theme 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought ]

Full Idea

The metaphysical inquiry into the nature and composition of what have been called Abstract Ideas, or in other words, of the notions which answer in the mind to classes and to general names, belongs not to Logic, but to a different science.

Gist of Idea

The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science

Source

John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1)

Book Ref

Mill,John Stuart: 'System of Logic (9th ed, 2 vols)' [Longmans, Green etc 1875], p.195


A Reaction

He doesn't name the science, but the point here seems to be precisely what Frege so vigorously disagreed with. I would say that the state of being 'abstract' has logical aspects, and can be partly described by logic, but that Mill is basically right.


The 51 ideas from 'System of Logic'

Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill]
Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer]
If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill]
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill]
Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill]
Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill]
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill]
Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill]
Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill]
'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill]
3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill]
Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill]
Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill]
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill]
Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill]
Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill]
12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill]
What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill]
Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill]
Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill]
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill]
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill]
Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR]
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro]