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Single Idea 5456
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
]
Full Idea
Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence.
Gist of Idea
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.43
A Reaction
Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it.
The
41 ideas
from 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'
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5443
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Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable
[Ellis]
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5442
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For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside
[Ellis]
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5445
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Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents
[Ellis]
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5446
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For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical
[Ellis]
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5444
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'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
|
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5448
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'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way
[Ellis]
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5447
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Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things
[Ellis]
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5462
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Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate
[Ellis]
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5458
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Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional
[Ellis]
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
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5453
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Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction
[Ellis]
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5457
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Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications
[Ellis, by PG]
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5460
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Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once
[Ellis]
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5459
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Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws
[Ellis]
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5461
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The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell
[Ellis]
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5464
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For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds
[Ellis]
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5463
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Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances
[Ellis]
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5466
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Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass
[Ellis]
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5468
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Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures)
[Ellis, by PG]
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5469
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The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions
[Ellis]
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5471
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Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws
[Ellis]
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5472
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Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures
[Ellis]
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5473
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The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds
[Ellis]
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5474
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Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances
[Ellis]
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5475
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We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws
[Ellis]
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5480
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The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws
[Ellis]
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5478
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Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility
[Ellis]
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5476
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Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori
[Ellis]
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5477
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One thing can look like something else, without being the something else
[Ellis]
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5479
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Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
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5483
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Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world
[Ellis]
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5482
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Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals
[Ellis]
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5481
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Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects
[Ellis]
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5486
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Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language
[Ellis]
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5485
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Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
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5484
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Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour
[Ellis]
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5488
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Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency
[Ellis]
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5489
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Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
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5490
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Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right
[Ellis]
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5491
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A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved
[Ellis]
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5487
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Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology
[Ellis]
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