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Single Idea 5456
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
]
Full Idea
Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence.
Gist of Idea
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.43
A Reaction
Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[rejection of the category of properties]:
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16621
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Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size
[Hobbes]
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4546
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We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
[Nietzsche]
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6063
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Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
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18439
|
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
[Quine]
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9017
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Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
[Quine]
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7925
|
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
[Quine]
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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10295
|
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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3322
|
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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6078
|
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
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7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
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8959
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Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science
[Field,H, by Szabó]
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3906
|
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
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4029
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Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all
[Mellor/Oliver]
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16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
[Maudlin]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
[Macdonald,C]
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19121
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We can reduce properties to true formulas
[Halbach/Leigh]
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